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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In a bankruptcy proceeding, OEC Group, New York 
(“OEC”) asserted maritime liens on goods then in its 
possession, and it now appeals a ruling of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that 
certain contractual modifications to those liens were 
unenforceable.  Because we conclude that the modifications 
were enforceable as to goods then in OEC’s possession, we 
will reverse and remand for the District Court to craft an 
appropriate remedy. 
 
I. Background 
 
 Although the parties dispute the legal consequences of 
the facts, what happened is not in dispute.  World Imports, 
Ltd., World Imports Chicago, LLC, World Imports South, 
LLC, and 11000 LLC (collectively, “World Imports”)1 are 
business entities [A 206] that buy furniture wholesale and sell 
it to retail distributors.  OEC provided non-vessel-operating 
common carrier transportation services2 to World Imports for 
approximately five years, including services to ensure that 
cargo was delivered from countries of origin to World 
Imports’ warehouse or to other United States destinations 
designated by World Imports.   
                                              
1 For convenience we refer to the several World 
Imports debtor-entities together in the singular. 
2 A non-vessel-operating common carrier “is a 
consolidator who acts as a carrier by arranging for the 
transportation of goods from port to port.”  Logistics Mgmt., 
Inc. v. One (1) Pyramid Tent Arena, 86 F.3d 908, 911 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation and editorial marks omitted). 
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A. Supporting Documents 
 
 On or about January 26, 2009, World Imports, Ltd. 
entered into an Application for Credit with OEC (the 
“Application”).  Page two of the Application, titled “Notice 
Concerning Limitation of Liability,” was signed by the vice 
president of World Imports, Ltd. and included the following 
language: 
 
[OEC] has adopted general terms and 
conditions of service.  These terms and 
conditions are printed on the back of or 
accompany every invoice issued by [OEC] and 
are incorporated herein by reference. … When 
[OEC] is acting as a carrier, the exact limits of 
liability and the other terms and conditions of 
carriage can be located on the ocean bill of 
lading or other shipping document such as the 
airway bill issued by the carrier (which is the 
contract between the parties).  Unless modified 
or superseded by the terms of the bill of lading 
or other contract of carriage, [OEC’s] general 
terms and conditions of service will also apply 
to the transaction.  However, the terms of the 
bill of lading prevail in all cases. 
 
(A 40.)   
 
 Page three of the Application, titled “Terms for Credit 
Accounts,” was signed by the bookkeeper of World Imports, 
Ltd. and said: 
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Specific terms and conditions of service … 
apply to the services performed by [OEC].  
These terms and conditions are established by 
contract as set forth in the governing instrument 
or by operation of law.  [OEC’s] standard 
payment terms require receipt of cash in 
advance of performance.  In the event that 
[OEC] extends credit to [World Imports], which 
is defined as permitting [World Imports] to pay 
for service within a specified period of time 
after performance by [OEC], [World Imports] 
agrees that the following additional terms are 
applicable. … 
As security for any existing and future 
indebtedness of [World Imports] to [OEC], 
including claims for charges, expenses or 
advances incurred by [OEC] in connection with 
any shipment or transaction of [World Imports], 
and whether or not presently contemplated by 
[World Imports] and [OEC], [World Imports] 
hereby grants to [OEC] a general lien and 
security interest in any and all property of 
[World Imports] (including goods and 
documents relating thereto) then or thereafter in 
[OEC’s] possession, custody or control or en 
route (the “Collateral”).  This general lien and 
security interest shall be in addition to any other 
rights [OEC] has or may acquire under other 
agreements and/or applicable law, and shall 
survive delivery or release of any specific 
property of [World Imports]. … 
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(A 37 (emphasis added).) 
 
 For each container of goods it transported for World 
Imports, OEC provided to World Imports an invoice (the 
“Invoice”) which contained, in its “Terms and Conditions of 
Service,” the following provisions: 
 
These terms and conditions constitute a legally 
binding contract between the “Company” [i.e., 
OEC] and the “Customer” [i.e., World Imports]. 
… 
14. General Lien and Right to Sell 
Customer’s Property. 
(a) Company shall have a general and 
continuing lien on any and all property of 
Customer coming into Company’s actual or 
constructive possession or control for monies 
owed to Company with regard to the shipment 
on which the lien is claimed, a prior 
shipment(s) and/or both … .  
 
(A 42 (emphasis added).)   
 
 As required by federal law, OEC also publishes a tariff 
(the “Tariff”) with the Federal Maritime Commission, which 
governs its shipments.  Included with the Tariff is a Bill of 
Lading whose terms and conditions provide, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
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17. CARRIER’S LIEN 
The Carrier shall have a lien on the Goods, 
inclusive of any Container owned or leased by 
the Merchant and on all equipment and 
appurtenances thereto, as well as on any 
Charges[3] due any other person, and on any 
documents relating thereto, which lien shall 
survive delivery, for all sums due under this 
contract or any other contract or undertaking to 
which the Merchant was party or otherwise 
involved, including, but not limited to, General 
Average contributions, salvage and the cost of 
recovering such sums, inclusive of attorney’s 
fees.  Such lien may be enforced by the Carrier 
by public or private sale at the expense of and 
without notice to the Merchant. 
 
(A 54-55 (emphasis added).)4 
                                              
3 As defined in the Tariff, “Goods” referred to “the 
cargo received from the shipper” and “Charges” referred to 
“freight, deadfreight, demurrage and all expenses and money 
obligations incurred and payable by the Merchant.”  (A 43.) 
4 The record does not reflect the relationship of the 
various World Imports entities to one another, nor whether 
representatives from all of those entities signed credit 
applications similar to the Application executed by World 
Imports, Ltd.  Indeed, World Imports has argued that, because 
one page of the Application was signed by a bookkeeper, 
none of the World Imports entities is bound by that document.  
However, in the briefing and argument before us, World 
Imports has never taken issue with OEC’s assertion that all 
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B. Procedural Background 
 
 On July 3, 2013 (the “Petition Date”), World Imports 
filed voluntary petitions for relief in the Bankruptcy Court 
pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code 
(the “Bankruptcy Code”).  OEC promptly filed a motion for 
relief from the automatic stay imposed by Bankruptcy Code § 
362(a).  It argued that it was a secured creditor with a 
possessory maritime lien on World Imports’ goods in its 
possession and was entitled to refuse to release such goods 
unless and until certain prepetition claims were satisfied.  As 
exhibits to its motion, OEC provided documentation that, as 
of July 10, 2013, the total amount owed to OEC by World 
Imports was $1,452,956.  Of that amount, $458,251 was the 
estimated freight and related charges due on containers then 
in OEC’s possession (the “Landed Goods”).  The remaining 
$994,705 consisted of freight and related charges associated 
with goods for which OEC had previously provided 
transportation services (the “Prepetition Goods”).  OEC 
estimated the total value of World Imports’ goods then in 
OEC’s possession was approximately $1,926,363.   
 
 World Imports responded by filing an adversary 
proceeding against OEC and a motion for an expedited 
                                                                                                     
the World Imports entities are effectively bound by the 
contractual provisions of the Invoice and Tariff, both of 
which grant, like the Application, a continuing lien as security 
for past debts.  For purposes of our analysis, therefore, we 
take it as given that all of the World Imports entities are 
bound, at the very least, by the Invoice and the Tariff, and 
that the primary issue is the legal effect of the agreements 
reflected in those documents. 
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hearing to compel OEC to turn over all of World Imports’ 
“Current Goods,” which World Imports defined to include 
both the Landed Goods and goods then in transit for which 
OEC was to provide delivery in the near future.  (A 60.)  
World Imports represented its willingness to pay OEC for the 
freight charges on those Current Goods but not for the 
outstanding charges associated with the Prepetition Goods.  
After a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court granted the injunctive 
relief sought by World Imports, ordering that: 
 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §[]542, [World Imports 
is] entitled to immediate delivery and 
possession of the Current Goods and Defendant 
OEC shall immediately account for and deliver 
the Current Goods to [World Imports]; 
… 
Upon Defendant OEC’s delivery of the Current 
Goods to [World Imports], [World Imports] 
shall pay Defendant OEC: (a) the regular freight 
charges on the Current Goods; (b) documented 
demurrage/retention charges. 
 
(A 105.)  After OEC timely filed its notice of appeal from the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order, that court issued an opinion in 
support of its order.  See In re World Imports, Ltd. Inc., 498 
B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 
 OEC did not seek a stay of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order.  Rather, on appeal to the District Court, it requested 
entry of an order requiring World Imports to pay all 
outstanding amounts due for OEC’s transportation services 
or, in the alternative, providing OEC with “valid, fully 
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enforceable replacement liens on assets of [World Imports] in 
the amount of $1,926,363.”  (A 243.)  The District Court 
ordered the parties to brief “whether the specific contract at 
issue between the parties created a maritime lien … .”  (A 
299.)  After that briefing, the Court entered an order on 
January 22, 2015, affirming the order of the Bankruptcy 
Court.  Specifically, the District Court held that OEC did not 
possess a valid maritime lien on the Prepetition Goods 
because “the provisions in OEC’s contract with [World 
Imports] purporting to give OEC a lien on goods in its 
possession for freight charges for the Prepetition Goods [are] 
unenforceable.”  World Imports, Ltd. v. OEC Group New 
York, 526 B.R. 127, 135 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  Accordingly, OEC 
could not assert a maritime lien to supersede interests secured 
according to the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in 
various jurisdictions.  Id. at 136.  OEC timely appealed.  
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II. DISCUSSION5 
 
 OEC frames its appeal as a single question, namely, 
whether the Bankruptcy Court and District Court erred in 
holding that the contract provisions at issue, which purported 
to give OEC maritime liens on goods in its possession both 
for freight charges on those goods and for unpaid charges on 
prior shipments, were unenforceable.  In its response, World 
Imports has added the further question of whether OEC’s 
failure to obtain a stay of the Bankruptcy Court’s order 
renders the appeal moot.  We address the latter question first. 
 
A. Mootness 
 
 World Imports argues that OEC’s appeal should be 
dismissed as constitutionally moot because OEC failed to 
obtain a stay of the Bankruptcy Court’s order and, instead, 
fully complied with that order by releasing the Current Goods 
                                              
5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), the Bankruptcy 
Court had jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding, which 
was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), 
and (O).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 1292(a), the 
District Court had jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order granting injunctive relief.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the District 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In our review, we 
“exercise the same standard of review as the District Court 
when it reviewed the original appeal from the Bankruptcy 
Court.  Thus, we review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of 
fact for clear error and exercise plenary review over the 
Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations.”  In re Handel, 570 
F. 3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
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to World Imports in exchange for payment for the charges on 
those goods.  That argument, however, fails to account for 
remedies that may still be granted to OEC.  As we observed 
in In re Continental Airlines, 
 
an appeal is moot in the constitutional sense 
only if events have taken place during the 
pendency of the appeal that make it impossible 
for the court to grant any effectual relief 
whatsoever.  An appeal is not moot merely 
because a court cannot restore the parties to the 
status quo ante.  Rather, when a court can 
fashion some form of meaningful relief, even if 
it only partially redresses the grievances of the 
prevailing party, the appeal is not moot. 
 
91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Church of Scientology of California v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992).  In this case, although 
OEC complied with the Bankruptcy Court’s order by 
delivering the Current Goods, it has asked for relief that 
would remedy its loss from the surrender of those goods, 
specifically, a court order either requiring World Imports to 
pay its outstanding debts to OEC or granting OEC 
enforceable replacement liens on other assets of World 
Imports.  Because we are not precluded from granting any 
effective relief, OEC’s appeal is not moot.6 
                                              
6 Although World Imports cites Continental Airlines 
for the authority that failure to seek a stay may, in some 
circumstances, justify dismissal of an appeal, the language on 
which it relies was describing not constitutional but equitable 
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B. Whether OEC Held a Valid Maritime Lien 
 
 The District Court concluded, and World Imports does 
not dispute, that a valid maritime lien would supersede any 
UCC security interests that may exist in the World Imports 
cargo.  World Imports also concedes that OEC possessed a 
valid maritime lien on the Current Goods “for the actual 
freight charges associated with the Current Goods.”7  
(Appellees’ Br. 10 n.5.)  Thus, the only dispute is whether 
OEC held a valid maritime lien for charges associated with 
the Prepetition Goods. 
 
1. Maritime Liens Generally 
 
 “A maritime lien is a privileged claim upon maritime 
property, such as a vessel, arising out of services rendered to 
                                                                                                     
mootness, see Continental, 91 F.3d at 558, which is not at 
issue here. 
7 OEC cites numerous authorities to establish that, as a 
non-vessel-operating common carrier contracting primarily to 
transport goods by sea, its contracts with World Imports were 
maritime contracts.  Moreover, OEC argues that, although it 
does not physically transport goods, it takes legal 
responsibility for their transportation and thus “is treated by 
the law as a bona fide carrier entitled to assert a maritime lien 
on cargo.”  (Appellant’s Br. 13 n.4 (citing Logistics Mgmt., 
86 F.3d at 913-15).)  Although World Imports disputes that 
its contracts with OEC, by themselves, created maritime liens, 
it does not dispute that OEC’s role as a non-vessel-operating 
common carrier created maritime liens arising by operation of 
law. 
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or injuries caused by that property.”  1 Thomas J. 
Schoenbaum, Adm. and Mar. Law § 9-1, at 683 (5th ed. 
2011).  Maritime liens are a security device intended “to keep 
ships moving in commerce while preventing them from 
escaping their debts by sailing away.”  Id. at 684-85.  Thus, 
such a lien attaches to the maritime property from the 
moment a debt arises, and adheres, even through changes in 
the property’s ownership, until extinguished by operation of 
law.  Id. at 683. 
 
 Because maritime liens enjoy a special priority status 
and may operate without notice, courts are hesitant to 
recognize new forms of them or new circumstances under 
which such liens may arise.  See Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. 
Pacific Export Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 490, 499 (1923) (“The 
maritime privilege or lien, though adhering to the vessel, is a 
secret one which may operate to the prejudice of general 
creditors and purchasers without notice and is therefore stricti 
juris and cannot be extended by construction, analogy or 
inference.” (citing Vandewater v. Mills, Claimant of Yankee 
Blade, 60 U.S. 82 (1856))).  Federal courts nevertheless “have 
full authority to update old doctrines and to recognize new 
forms of liens if warranted by new conditions.”  Logistics 
Mgmt., Inc. v. One (1) Pyramid Tent Arena, 86 F.3d 908, 913 
n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted) (collecting 
cases). 
 
 In much the same way that traditional maritime liens 
against a ship were based on the legal fiction that the ship was 
the wrongdoer, see 1 Schoenbaum, supra, § 9-1, at 683-84, 
maritime law recognizes a reciprocal claim against the ship’s 
cargo for debts associated with it.  
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Subject to the exception that the lien of the 
shipowner may be displaced by an 
unconditional delivery of the goods before the 
consignee is required to pay the freight, or by an 
inconsistent and irreconcilable provision in the 
charter-party or bill of lading, the rule is 
universal as understood in the decisions of the 
Federal courts, that the ship is bound to the 
merchandise and the merchandise to the ship for 
the performance on the part of the shipper and 
shipowner of their respective contracts. 
 
The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 449-50 (1869).  
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in its influential opinion 
in a case captioned simply The Bird of Paradise, such liens 
on cargo may arise out of contracts to pay freight.  72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 545 (1866); see also 2 Thomas A. Russell, Benedict on 
Admiralty § 44, at 3-50 n.2 (7th ed. rev. 2010) (collecting 
cases). 
 
2. Waiver of Liens for Unpaid Freight 
 
 A lien for unpaid freight “arises from the right of the 
ship-owner to retain the possession of the goods until the 
freight is paid,” and thus is lost upon “unconditional delivery 
to the consignee.”  Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. at 555 (emphasis 
added).  Yet, because it would frustrate commerce to require 
shipowners to retain their liens only by actual possession of 
the implicated cargo,8 a shipowner enjoys a strong 
                                              
8 See In re 4,885 Bags of Linseed, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 
108, 114 (1861) (emphasis added): 
It is in the interest of the ship-owner that his 
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presumption that, absent a clear indication to the contrary, he 
has not waived his cargo lien upon delivery of that cargo.9  To 
                                                                                                     
vessel should discharge her cargo as speedily as 
possible after her arrival at the port of delivery.  
And it would be a serious sacrifice of his 
interests if the ship was compelled, in order to 
preserve the lien, to remain day after day with 
her cargo on board, waiting until the consignee 
found it convenient to pay the freight, or until 
the lien could be enforced in a court of 
admiralty.  The consignee, too, in many 
instances, might desire to see the cargo unladen 
before he paid the freight, in order to ascertain 
whether all of the goods mentioned in the bill of 
lading were on board, and not damaged by the 
fault of the ship. … And if the cargo cannot be 
unladen and placed in the warehouse of the 
consignee, without waiving the lien, it would 
seriously embarrass the ordinary operations 
and convenience of commerce, both as to the 
ship-owner and the merchant. 
9 See Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. at 556 (emphasis 
added):  
Where the stipulation is, that the goods are to be 
delivered at the port of discharge before the 
freight is paid, without any condition or 
qualification, it seems to be agreed that the lien 
of the ship-owner for the payment of the freight 
is waived and lost, as the right of lien is 
inseparably associated with the possession of 
the goods.  Unless the stipulation is, that the 
17 
 
overcome the presumption against waiver, a court 
determining whether a cargo lien has been waived by 
unconditional delivery may consider, among other things, 
whether there was an understanding between the parties 
regarding retention of the lien either before or at the time the 
consignee took possession of the cargo,10 whether there was a 
                                                                                                     
delivery shall precede the payment of the 
freight, and the language employed as applied 
to the subject-matter and the surrounding 
circumstances is such as clearly to show that the 
change of possession is to be absolute and 
unconditional, the lien is not displaced, as the 
presumption of law is the other way, which is 
never to be regarded as controlled, except in 
cases where the language employed in the 
instrument satisfactorily indicates that such is 
the intention of the parties. 
See also N.H. Shipping Corp. v. Freights of the S/S Jackie 
Hause, 181 F. Supp. 165, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“This right of 
the vessel [to a cargo lien] is so strong in the eyes of the 
admiralty that it will only be considered relinquished by the 
most unequivocal and express terms or the most absolute and 
unconditional surrender.” (citing Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. 
545)); 1 Schoenbaum, supra, § 9-7, at 728-29 (“A lienholder 
may waive his lien either expressly or by implication, but 
waiver is not favored, and the courts will require a clearly 
manifested intention to forego the lien.” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
10 See The Eddy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 481, 495-96 (1866) 
(affirming that courts will uphold the parties’ agreement that 
a cargo lien shall survive delivery). 
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stipulation in the contract of affreightment inconsistent with 
the exercise of a lien, or whether other security was taken 
when the cargo was discharged.  2 Russell, supra, § 44, at 3-
52.   
 
 Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court 
appear to have assumed, without analysis, that OEC did not 
merely deliver the Prepetition Goods to World Imports, but 
did so unconditionally and thus in waiver of its liens on those 
goods.11  Given the strong presumption against waiver, and in 
the absence of clear evidence of unconditional delivery, we 
cannot agree with that assumption.  The evidence appears to 
us to be very much to the contrary.  Consistent with the 
presumption against waiver, both the Application and the 
Tariff expressly state the understanding of the parties that 
OEC would hold liens against any World Imports goods in 
OEC’s possession as security for (among other things) 
charges incurred for any shipment of World Imports goods, 
and that such liens would “survive delivery.”  (A 37, 54.)  
Independent of the question of whether those provisions are 
fully enforceable in and of themselves, they are compelling 
evidence that OEC did not clearly intend to waive its cargo 
liens on the Prepetition Goods by making an unconditional 
                                              
11 See In re World Imports, Ltd. Inc., 498 B.R. 58, 62 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (rejecting OEC’s reliance on Bird of 
Paradise, emphasizing that that case “nowhere explicitly 
states that a maritime lien may be extended by contract to 
secure goods already shipped and unconditionally released to 
an owner” (original emphasis)); World Imports, Ltd. v. OEC 
Group N.Y, 526 B.R. 127, 133 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (referring to 
the Prepetition Goods as “those already unconditionally 
delivered”). 
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delivery of such goods.  They show instead that there was an 
agreement between the parties, for the purpose of 
perpetuating any such lien, to apply unwaived and unsatisfied 
liens toward cargo currently in OEC’s possession, the cargo 
essentially taking the place of cargo previously delivered out 
of OEC’s possession.  Moreover, this case is akin to Capitol 
Transportation, Inc. v. United States, in which the First 
Circuit rejected the argument that a carrier had waived its 
liens on prior shipments when it released shipping containers 
“without providing notice of a continuing lien,” noting that 
“the relevant tariffs in effect in this case provide that such 
liens survive delivery of the goods.”  612 F.2d 1312, 1324-25 
(1st Cir. 1979).  Those tariffs, the court affirmed, “are 
considered binding and in essence carry the force of law.”  Id. 
at 1325.  In light of the express language of OEC’s Tariff, 
that case squarely supports the position that OEC did not 
unconditionally deliver the Prepetition Goods, and hence 
retained its liens on those goods.   
 
 We further note that the persistence of a lien through 
substitution is not a novel practice, as “[i]t is familiar doctrine 
of the admiralty courts that a maritime lien attaches not only 
to the original subject of the lien, but also to whatever is 
substituted for it, and that the lienholder may follow the 
proceeds wherever he can distinctly trace them.”  Bank of 
British N. Am. v. Freights, etc., of the Hutton, 137 F. 534, 536 
(2d Cir. 1905).  Cf. N.H. Shipping Corp. v. Freights of the S/S 
Jackie Hause, 181 F. Supp. 165, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 
(holding that a shipowner had not waived its cargo lien when 
its release of the cargo was conditioned on the substitution of 
freight money, held in escrow, for such cargo).     
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 World Imports disputes that the parties could have 
created valid maritime liens entirely through contract, but it 
has not attempted to dispute that, as a general proposition, 
OEC’s carrier services created enforceable maritime liens by 
operation of law.  Indeed, World Imports’ consistent 
acknowledgment that “OEC possessed a maritime lien on the 
Current Goods for the actual freight charges associated with 
the Current Goods” is also, by implication, a tacit concession 
that OEC, at least initially, must have possessed comparable 
maritime liens on the Prepetition Goods for freight charges 
associated with those goods.  (Appellees’ Br. 10.)  Hence, if 
one concludes, as we do, that OEC never waived those liens 
on the Prepetition Goods, then the question of whether the 
parties could and did create the liens solely through contract 
is a red herring.  Instead, the dispositive questions are 
whether liens arising by operation of maritime law may be 
modified or extended by agreement, and whether such an 
agreement may extend an unwaived lien onto property 
currently in the lienholder’s possession. 
 
3. Enforceability of Maritime Lien 
 Provisions 
 
 World Imports argues against the enforceability of the 
parties’ contractual lien modifications by pointing to portions 
of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bird of Paradise which 
state that maritime liens on cargo are established by operation 
of law rather than agreement of the parties and arise from the 
shipowners’ possessory interest in the cargo.  Attempting to 
place on OEC the burden of proving both that the parties 
intended to preserve the maritime liens for the Prepetition 
Goods and that the delivery of those goods was not 
21 
 
unconditional,12 World Imports argues that OEC has failed to 
produce “any evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that the 
delivery of the Prepetition Goods was anything but 
unconditional.”  (Appellees’ Br. 14 n.9.)  Insisting that OEC 
made such an unconditional delivery of the Prepetition 
Goods, World Imports essentially argues that Bird of 
Paradise does not authorize the parties to reassert waived 
liens from the Prepetition Goods onto the Current Goods.  
Both the District Court and Bankruptcy Court accepted that 
argument and declined to interpret Bird of Paradise as 
authorizing the parties’ contractual extension of OEC’s 
maritime liens.   
 
 To recap, our analysis of the facts begins from a very 
different premise than that adopted by the District Court and 
Bankruptcy Court.  They assumed that OEC waived its liens 
on the Prepetition Goods through unconditional delivery but 
nevertheless tried, through contract, to revive those liens and 
place them on the Current Goods.  We conclude that OEC did 
not waive its previous liens but rather agreed with World 
Imports in advance that such liens would survive delivery and 
would be applied to any of World Imports’ goods currently in 
                                              
12 Specifically, World Imports cites Logistics Mgmt., 
86 F.3d at 914-15, as supportive of their position that “OEC 
bears the burden to produce evidence which shows that the 
parties intended to preserve the maritime lien.”  (Appellees’ 
Br. 14 n.9.)  Although Logistics Mgmt. reiterates that a 
maritime lien is lost on unconditional delivery, we discern 
nothing in that case placing on the lienholder the burden of 
proving that the parties intended to preserve the lien.  Rather, 
as noted above, the presumption falls heavily in the opposite 
direction. 
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OEC’s possession.  On that foundation, we hold that their 
agreement to extend the liens is enforceable. 
 
 Despite World Imports’ contentions, the opinion in 
Bird of Paradise made clear that there is no internal 
contradiction in recognizing a lien as a creature of maritime 
law that, once created by operation of law, may be extended 
or modified by agreement of the parties.  In that case, the 
Court affirmed that a maritime lien “arises from the usages of 
commerce, independently of the agreement of the parties … 
.”  Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. at 555; see also Osaka, 260 U.S. 
at 499-500 (clarifying that “[t]he contract of affreightment 
itself creates no lien, and this court has consistently declared 
that the obligation between ship and cargo is mutual and 
reciprocal and does not attach until the cargo is on board or in 
the master’s custody”); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon 
S.S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117, 121 (1933) (affirming that, while 
contracts may form the basis of a maritime lien, it is “[o]nly 
upon the lading of the vessel or at least when she is ready to 
receive the cargo” that the lien arises or attaches).  In other 
words, a traditional maritime lien cannot be created by 
contract alone, but that does not mean that such liens, once 
created, are beyond contractual modification.   
 
 On the contrary, immediately after recognizing that a 
cargo lien, being possessory, “is lost by an unconditional 
delivery to the consignee,” Bird of Paradise used broad 
language supporting contractual modification and extension 
of the lien beyond delivery, stating: 
 
Parties, however, may frame their contract of 
affreightment as they please, and of course may 
employ words to affirm the existence of the 
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maritime lien, or to extend or modify it, or they 
may so frame their contract as to exclude it 
altogether.  They may agree that the goods, 
when the ship arrives at the port of destination, 
shall be deposited in the warehouse of the 
consignee or owner, and that the transfer and 
deposit shall not be regarded as the waiver of 
the lien; and where they so agree, the settled 
rule in this court is, that the law will uphold the 
agreement and support the lien. 
 
72 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added) 
 
 The Bankruptcy Court interpreted that passage more 
narrowly than the language calls for, hanging great weight on 
the opinion’s prior use of the definite article “the” before the 
word “freight” to conclude that a maritime lien was limited to 
the immediate circumstances in which it arose: 
 
[In Bird of Paradise], the High Court stated that 
the “[l]egal effect of such a lien is that the ship-
owner, as carrier by water, may retain the goods 
until the freight is paid … “  Id. at 555.  It added 
that the lien “arises from the right of the ship-
owner to retain the possession of the goods until 
the freight is paid, and is lost by an 
unconditional delivery to the consignee.”  Id.  
This Court places emphasis on the definite 
article (“the”) preceding the word “freight.”  It 
reads those statements to limit the extent of a 
maritime lien to the freight charges for those 
goods on that vessel at that time.  It does not 
share OEC’s reading of the case to allow the 
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parties to unconditionally extend the lien to 
unpaid freight for prior cargo deliveries.  See 
also Newell [v. Norton, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 257, 
262 (1865)] (“Indeed, the only power the 
contracting parties have respecting such liens as 
attach as consequences to certain contracts is, 
that the creditor may waive the lien, and may by 
express stipulation, or by his manner of dealing 
in certain cases, give credit exclusively to those 
who would also have been bound to him 
personally by the same contract which would 
have given rise to the lien.”). 
 
In re World Imports, 498 B.R. at 61-62 (original emphasis).  
Besides its underlying assumption that OEC waived its prior 
liens through unconditional delivery, we think the Bankruptcy 
Court’s analysis is flawed by two significant oversights.  
First, it overlooks the context and sequence in which the 
supposedly limiting language appeared in the Bird of 
Paradise opinion.  As mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion began by describing the origins and traditional form 
of maritime liens, but then, in its transition between 
paragraphs, signaled that the parties may depart from the 
norm by contractual agreement.  See Bird of Paradise, 72 
U.S. at 555 (“[T]he lien … arises from the right of the ship-
owner to retain the possession of the goods until the freight is 
paid, and is lost by an unconditional delivery to the 
consignee.  Parties, however, may frame their contract of 
affreightment as they please, and of course may employ 
words to affirm the existence of the maritime lien, or to 
extend or modify it … .” (emphasis added and footnote 
omitted)).  Had the order of the statements been reversed – 
that is, had the Supreme Court stressed the traditional form of 
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maritime liens after discussing contractual modification – that 
might provide a stronger basis from which to argue that the 
Supreme Court intended to limit (albeit only implicitly) the 
scope of contractual modifications of liens to something 
closely resembling the traditional form.  However, read in 
proper sequence, the Supreme Court’s opinion signals the 
opposite message, namely, that despite the non-contractual 
origins and traditional form of maritime liens, parties are free 
to contractually extend or modify an existing lien “as they 
please.”  Id., 72 U.S. at 555. 
 
 The Bankruptcy Court’s second oversight is its casual 
citation to language appearing in the report of another 
Supreme Court case, Newell v. Norton, language that is not 
the Supreme Court’s but is merely a summary of one party’s 
position in the syllabus of that case, on a point which 
ultimately played no role in the Court’s analysis.  See Newell, 
70 U.S. at 261-62 (documenting the arguments of counsel for 
the appellants in that case).  World Imports has pushed that 
erroneous reliance on Newell’s syllabus at every stage of the 
proceedings (see A 65, 258, 318; Appellees’ Br. 13), even 
after OEC has repeatedly, and correctly, drawn attention to 
the citation’s complete absence of authoritative value (see A 
223, 227, 231, 274, 280, 307; Appellant’s Br. 22, 25 n.8; 
Reply Br. 8-9).  The dogged determination of World Imports 
to perpetuate a clear error of citation is both troubling and 
revealing.  
 
 Especially in light of the “familiar doctrine” that a 
maritime lien may attach to property substituted for the 
original object of the lien, Bank of British N. Am., 137 F. at 
536, we see no sound reason why the parties’ contractual 
transfer of the unwaived liens to the Current Goods should 
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not have been enforceable.13  See also Logistics Mgmt., 86 
F.3d at 914 (“Contractual provisions regarding liens on cargo 
for freight are enforceable in admiralty.” (citing Bird of 
Paradise, 72 U.S. at 555)); id. (“[A] lien on the cargo is 
normally expressly granted in the bills of lading and charter 
parties.  If so, the extent of the relevant lien is governed by 
the terms of the lien clause.” (quoting Eric M. Danoff, 
Provisional Remedies in Adm. U.S., 4 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 293, 
299 (1992))).   
 
                                              
13 Despite the seemingly broad scope of contractual 
modification contemplated by Bird of Paradise, there must of 
course be some limiting principal that would prevent 
contracting parties from unilaterally altering the rights of 
bona fide purchasers whose interests would otherwise be 
affected by a continuing lien on cargo that has passed into the 
stream of commerce.  The facts of this case, however, do not 
implicate that concern, as OEC has only sought to enforce its 
liens on goods that were still in its possession, and has 
conceded that the case may be resolved on those more limited 
grounds.  Hence, while we understand the Bankruptcy 
Court’s resistance to “the proposition that the freight charges 
for goods upon their release from a warehouse and entry into 
the hands of others in the ordinary course of commerce 
remain secured by a pre-existing maritime lien,” In re World 
Imports, 498 B.R. at 62 (original emphasis), we emphasize 
that the disposition of this case concerns only the 
enforceability of a contractual transfer of a lien from 
previously released goods to currently held goods.  In short, 
the enforceability of a provision asserting a maritime lien on 
goods that have already been released into the stream of 
commerce is not at issue in this case. 
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 Both the District Court and World Imports raise the 
policy argument that an extended maritime lien on cargo 
could hurt innocent third parties.  In doing so, they rely 
primarily on Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Good Hope Refineries, 
Inc., 604 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1979), in which the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that a transportation provider could not assert a 
lien on undelivered cargo to secure unpaid charges on already 
delivered cargo.  After concluding, as a matter of contractual 
interpretation, that the applicable lien clause did not guarantee 
this right “[o]n its face” and was not otherwise ambiguous, id. 
at 871, the court opined, in dicta, that a broader construction 
of the contractual language might also have unfavorable 
consequences to third parties: 
 
[An] expansive interpretation of this maritime 
lien clause … would have consequences far 
beyond the situation where the cargo belonged 
to the charterer and was seized before it left the 
vessel.  The lien for the debts of past voyages 
would extend to cargo owned by others, and 
might, if all the other terms of the entire clause 
were literally enforced, follow that cargo after 
delivery, even if all freights due for its carriage 
were paid.  We decline to sanction 
reinterpretation of words apparently clear to 
permit this result. 
 
Id. at 873 (emphasis added).   
 
 The Fifth Circuit’s policy concerns were apparently 
ancillary to what the court considered a question of 
contractual interpretation, but the District Court in the present 
case decided that the lien clauses now at issue are 
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unenforceable on policy grounds alone.  Specifically, it 
worried that “[a] third-party purchaser of the undelivered 
goods would have no notice that the goods it purchased could 
be withheld pursuant to a maritime lien on previously-shipped 
goods.”  World Imports, 526 B.R. at 134.   
 
 Putting aside the real and immediate harm of depriving 
OEC of the benefit of its bargain with World Imports, at least 
three other considerations weigh against the District Court’s 
policy concern.  First, any risk to third parties is mitigated by 
the fact that, unlike the voyage charter at issue in Atlantic 
Richfield, OEC’s Tariff not only specifies the applicability of 
the maritime lien to unsatisfied debts of previous shipments in 
unambiguous language, but does so in a published document. 
 
 Second, the potential of harm to third parties is 
implicated regardless of whether the maritime lien is intended 
to satisfy the consignee’s immediate charges or past ones.  In 
either case, the lien creates the danger that the consignee’s 
failure to meet its obligations to the carrier will impede its 
ability to put the cargo into the hands of a third party.  “[T]his 
is a characteristic of all maritime liens.” Usher v. M/V Ocean 
Wave, 27 F.3d 370, 374 (9th Cir. 1994).  Any marginal 
increase in the risk to third parties (above the risk inherent in 
a traditional lien on cargo) is limited in this case because, as 
already noted supra n.13, the goods to which the previous 
liens attached were still in the carrier’s possession.  In other 
words, the type of lien asserted in this case was still, at 
bottom, a possessory lien over goods that had not yet entered 
the stream of commerce. 
 
 Third, we must consider the potential benefits to 
commerce of enforcing the parties’ voluntary decision to 
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enter into this type of credit arrangement.  Although World 
Imports has argued that commerce is hindered by allowing a 
current shipment of goods “to be held hostage” to secure the 
payment of prior shipments, that argument ignores the 
commercial benefit implicit in that or any other credit 
arrangement that facilitates the exchange of goods or services 
with a guarantee of future payment.  The relevant fact is not 
simply that the most recent shipment was held up, but that 
numerous prior shipments were not held up because the 
shipper had assurances that it could release those shipments 
conditionally, without surrendering its liens.  In other words, 
while the traditional cargo lien promotes commerce by 
ensuring that a particular ship can assert a secured claim even 
after the cargo has conditionally left the ship, OEC’s 
contractually modified lien further promotes commerce over a 
series of transactions by ensuring that the carrier can retain its 
secured claims in an ongoing business relationship.14 
                                              
14 OEC also points to Eagle Marine Transp. Co. v. A 
Cargo of Hardwood Chips, 1998 WL 382141 (E.D. La. July 
8, 1998), as persuasive authority that a lien purporting to 
enforce freight charges on past shipments is enforceable.  In 
that case, the district court noted that the contract giving rise 
to the lien provided as follows: “Seller has a maritime lien on 
all cargo which it may assert and enforce to ensure payment 
of the freight and demurrage on all current en route shipments 
and earlier completed shipments.  Waiver of such lien on 
prior shipments does not constitute a waiver as to the cargo 
covered by this agreement.”  Id. at *1.  OEC essentially 
argues that that case tacitly approved the type of contractual 
extension of a cargo lien as is implicated here, because “if the 
court had believed that such a lien provision was not 
enforceable, it would have so indicated … .”  (Appellant’s Br. 
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 Besides its public policy argument, the District Court 
also relied on the oft-cited principle that maritime liens 
should be strictly construed, reasoning that 
 
[n]o Supreme Court decision has addressed 
whether parties may contractually modify a 
maritime lien to make the delivery of existing 
shipments contingent on the consignee’s 
payment for already-delivered shipments.  As 
maritime liens are to be strictly construed, this 
Court declines OEC’s invitation to extend or 
modify maritime liens beyond the 
circumstances indicated by Supreme Court 
precedent.  See Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 260 U.S. 
at 499 … . 
 
World Imports, 526 B.R. at 132-33.   
 
 The case which the District Court cited, Osaka Shosen 
Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., reaffirmed that “[t]he 
maritime privilege or lien … is a secret one which may 
                                                                                                     
37.)  However, as the District Court pointed out, the issue in 
that case was whether the transporter had discharged the lien 
by unconditional delivery, and the court’s opinion did not 
specify “whether the lien at issue was asserted to enforce 
payment of freight charges to previous shipments” as opposed 
to the current shipment.  World Imports, 526 B.R. at 135.  
Thus, the opinion did not squarely address the enforceability 
of a lien for charges incurred on past shipments.  
Nevertheless, the circumstances of that case give at least 
some indication that the type of contractual modification at 
issue in this case is not novel. 
31 
 
operate to the prejudice of general creditors and purchasers 
without notice and is therefore stricit juris and cannot be 
extended by construction, analogy or inference.”  260 U.S. at 
499.  And while that principle is sound, we think the District 
Court has misapprehended its import.  The principle does not 
restrain the private modification of liens arising out of the 
traditional relationship between ship and cargo – e.g., the lien 
of the cargo owner on the ship or the lien of the shipowner on 
the cargo – but rather limits the judicial creation of new 
circumstances, outside that reciprocal relationship, under 
which liens may attach in the first instance.  The language 
proscribing the expansion of the lien universe “by 
construction, analogy or inference” curtails a court’s ability to 
recognize, by mere legal implication, previously 
unanticipated circumstances under which liens may arise by 
operation of maritime law, but says nothing about private 
parties’ ability to modify traditional liens by express 
agreement.  Reading that language to limit private lien 
modifications to those forms previously and specifically 
blessed by the Supreme Court renders meaningless the same 
Court’s affirmation that parties may extend or modify liens 
and otherwise frame their contracts of affreightment as they 
please.  Compare Osaka, 260 U.S. at 499-500 (finding 
inadequate legal authority to recognize a new type of lien 
upon a ship for damages resulting from a failure to accept all 
the intended cargo),15 with Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. at 555 
                                              
15 The Osaka court stressed that, under well-
established law, the reciprocal obligations between ship and 
cargo, from which maritime liens arise, do not attach until the 
cargo is physically loaded on the ship; hence, the court 
declined to recognize, by inference alone, a lien on the ship 
for cargo that was contractually anticipated but never actually 
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(recognizing that parties “of course” may agree “to extend or 
modify” a lien “aris[ing] from the usages of commerce”).  
The District Court appears to have blurred the distinction 
between judicial enforcement of a private contract and more 
comprehensive judicial rule-making, interpreting OEC’s 
enforceability argument as an invitation for the court itself to 
“extend or modify maritime liens” beyond their traditional 
forms.  World Imports, Ltd., 526 B.R. at 132.  In this case at 
least, there is a material difference between judicial expansion 
of a legal doctrine and judicial enforcement of a private 
agreement to vary from a legal default. 
 
                                                                                                     
loaded aboard.  See Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Pacific Export 
Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1923); see also 
Vandewater v. Mills, Claimant of Yankee Blade, 60 U.S. 82; 
89-90 (1856) (invoking the principle of stricti juris in 
concluding that, where the ship does not receive the cargo, no 
maritime lien or privilege attaches).  That is a very different 
situation from the one presented here, where the question is 
whether the parties can contractually preserve an existing lien 
(that is, for cargo that was actually loaded and conditionally 
delivered) and then apply that surviving lien to subsequent 
cargo that was also loaded and still in the carrier’s possession.  
Upholding a lien in Osaka would have required recognition of 
a new type of maritime lien incompatible with the theoretical 
underpinnings of the reciprocal lien relationship – i.e., it 
would have created a new class of lien for cargo that never 
touched the ship.  By contrast, the present case does not 
require the recognition of any liens other than those arising 
through the traditional ship-and-cargo relationship, all based 
on cargo actually loaded and shipped. 
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 One last argument against enforceability of OEC’s 
liens is embodied in the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that 
the contractual arrangement presented here cannot stand 
because, if permitted, it would effectively negate the utility of 
general lien laws adopted by the states.  According to the 
Bankruptcy Court: “[I]f OEC’s position were correct, parties 
would never need recourse to the general lien laws of the 
several states.  An agreement to extend the shipper’s maritime 
lien to any unpaid debt would co-opt the field and suffice to 
render any further security arrangements wholly 
unnecessary.”  In re World Imports, Ltd. Inc., 498 B.R. at 62 
(original emphasis).  Besides being overstated, that 
conclusion rests on a faulty premise.  Implicit in the stated 
concern is, once again, an assumption that all previous liens 
on goods from prior shipments were unconditionally waived.  
In that view, OEC is attempting a post hoc resurrection of 
liens that it had already surrendered by unconditional delivery 
– a contractual cheat that would allow it to essentially jump 
back to the front of the creditor line after relinquishing its 
spot.   
 
 Given the express agreement that OEC would not 
waive its liens upon delivery, however, the parties’ 
contractual modification is better regarded as an ex ante 
agreement that OEC would simply retain the position already 
afforded to it by operation of maritime law.  Put differently, 
the contractual extension of OEC’s outstanding liens from the 
Prepetition Goods onto the Current Goods allowed OEC, at 
most, to do in the aggregate what maritime law already 
permitted it to do piecemeal with individual shipments, and 
World Imports’ other creditors are only disadvantaged to the 
same extent they would have been had OEC engaged in the 
more protracted, commerce-restrictive process of withholding 
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each shipment until its attendant lien was satisfied.  If parties 
to a maritime contract, through negotiation and private 
ordering, opt to streamline that process by retaining and 
consolidating liens arising by operation of longstanding 
maritime law, at least as such liens apply to goods still in the 
shipper’s possession, there is no compelling argument to undo 
such an agreement.16 
 
 In sum, we do not think the policy concerns roused by 
World Imports and accepted by the Bankruptcy Court and 
District Court are sufficient to either outweigh the benefits to 
commerce of allowing two sophisticated businesses to 
contract for a mutually agreeable transportation and credit 
arrangement, or to curtail the broad contractual freedom that 
Bird of Paradise on its face allows. 
                                              
16 We are sympathetic to the Bankruptcy Court’s 
concern that permitting the extension of maritime liens 
necessarily preempts the operation of state-based commercial 
law, and thus disadvantages – or at least maintains at a 
disadvantage – all creditors whose claims arise under such 
law.  The question of whether centuries of federal admiralty 
law favoring the claims of the carrier above other creditors 
should give way to more modernized statutory schemes may 
be open to legitimate debate.  But the debate is not for us.  
Congress is free to change policy in this area at any time.  
Unless and until it does, the federal common law of admiralty 
still prevails over state-based claims, and the traditions of that 
law are sufficiently well-established to allow carriers holding 
advantageous maritime liens to make private agreements to 
preserve, modify and extend those liens through the 
substitution of currently held goods. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
 Given the strong presumption that OEC did not waive 
its maritime liens on the Prepetition Goods, the clear 
documentation that the parties intended such liens to survive 
delivery, the familiar principle that a maritime lien may attach 
to property substituted for the original object of the lien, and 
the parties’ general freedom to modify or extend existing 
liens by contract, we conclude that the parties’ agreement to 
apply those unwaived liens toward the Current Goods is 
enforceable.  Thus, we will reverse and remand so that OEC 
may be granted relief appropriate to its valid maritime liens. 
